The Latvian banking crisis : lessons learned by Fleming, Alex & Talley, Samuel
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1590
The Latvian Banking Crisis






Europe and Central Asia
Country  Department  IV

















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1590
Summary findings
In the spring of 1995, Latvia experienced the largest  regulation, and implementing solid accounting,
banking crisis in the former Soviet Union to date,  disclosure, and auditing standards. It must also develop
involving the loss of about 40 percent  of the banking  effective ways to handle problem banks and to close
system's assets and liabilities. Fleming and Talley outline  insolvent banks promptly.
the Latvian authorities'  strategy for developing the  *  For banks in the state sector to be a source of
banking system and identify how and why it unraveled.  strength to the banking system, they must have strong
They discuss the World Bank's role and the lessons to be  effective management and be relatively free from
learned from the crisis, including the following:  political influence.
* Banking systems are exposed to stress in several  *  "Outlier"  banks - those expanding assets very
major ways. Enterprises - the main borrowers - quickly or offering particularly high deposit rates -
become subject to hard budget constraints (are cut off  should be subject to intense supervision.
from government funds) and are privatized. Inflation  *  Four things must be done to prevent fraud,
declines so enterprises can't  rely on rapidly increasing  incompetent management, and excessive risk-taking:
revenues to service bank debts. Economic reform tends  carefully screen those who want to get into banking;
to produce banking systems that are mainly privately  subject all banks to thorough, frequent onsite
owned - making them vulnerable to withdrawals, as the  examinations and assign the best examiners to the largest
public does not assume that failing banks will be bailed  banks; require annual audits of all banks by reputable
out.  auditing firms required to report significant irregularities
T  The government must protect  against this  to authorities;  and act decisively when fraud or bank
vulnerability by establishing a proper  legal framework for  difficulties are detected or suspected.
banking, developing effective bank supervision and
This paper - a product of the Enterprise and Financial Sector Development Division, Europe and Central Asia, Country
Department IV - is part of a larger effort in the region to distill the lessons of the first five years of transition. Copies of
the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Suzanne
Coffey, room H6-298, telephone 202-473-2635,  fax 202-522-0005, Internet address scoffey@worldbank.org. April 1996.
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Introduction  Savings Bank, the Industrial/Construction  Bank, a
Social Bank and an Agricultural  Bank. These banks
In the spring  of 1995,  Latvia  experienced  what  suddenly  had their ties to, and guidance  from, their
has been the largest banking crisis in the Former  former FSU-based  head offices  cut-off. Most of the
Soviet Union (FSU) to date, involving  the loss of  FSU  countries  converted these  branches  into
about 40% of the assets  and liabilities  of the banking  nationally-owned  banks that continued their former
system. The crisis has had a traumatic  affect on the  specialization. However,  with the exception  of the
banking system and on the public's confidence in  Savings Bank, the Latvian Governrnent  decided to
banks  at large.  The real economic  effect is gradually  combine the 45  branches of these former Soviet
being felt and is being manifest  in a slower rebound  banks  and place them under the auspices  of the Bank
in production  and economic growth than had been  of Latvia.  This approach had  its advantages  and
expected, and in a budget crisis with which it has  disadvantages. With regard to  the advantages,  it
become intricately  woven.  The political  fall-out  from  clearly allowed  the Latvian  Government  to proceed
the crisis has now been felt as the Latvian  public, in  on a  bank restructuring  strategy which had a very
the  context of  a  general election at  the end  of  flexible  departure  point.  It  permitted  the
September  1995, has  reacted against the  center  Government  to consider  a range of options:  selling
parties that have been at the heart of power for the  off all the branches  to the emerging  private sector;
last three years by voting for parties at the left and  privatizing  the branches individually  or in groups;
right extremes  of the political  spectrum.  structuring  one  or  more  state  banks;  or  a
combination  of these approaches. The disadvantage
The purpose of this paper is  to outline the  was that the Bank  of Latvia  did not play any type of
Latvian  authorities' strategy  for  developing the  governance  role in the  branches under  its wing.
banking system and  identify how  and  why  this  Branch managers, therefore, felt no accountability
unraveled. In particular,  the paper seeks  to establish  towards the President  of the Bank of Latvia or its
the causes of the banking crisis and describes  how  directors.  As a result, a sigrnificant  amount of bad
the authorities  dealt with it.  The role of the World  lending took place as branch managers followed  a
Bank is also  discussed  while, in a concluding  section,  business-as-usual  policy. An audit of the branches--
the  broader  lessons deriving from  the  Latvian  undertaken  with  the  support  of  the  Swiss
experience  are drawn  out.  Government--determined  that non-perforning loans
amounted  to about  Lat 25 million  (US$50  million) 3.
T-he  Evolving  Banking  System  and
Government  Strategy  In  1993, as  the  Government  decided on  a
strategy for dealing with the remnant of the state
In order to appreciate  the nature  of the banking  banking sector, a dichotomy  developed  between  its
crisis it is important  to place it in the context of the  approach  to enterprise  privatization  and that relating
evolving  structure  of the Latvian  banking  system  and  to the banking  sector.  The enterprise privatization
the  authorities'  strategy  towards  it.  Some  began to grind to a halt, caught up in a bureaucratic
commentators  have  described Latvian  strategy  process involving  an unduly  strong role for the line
towards bank restructuring as completely market  ministries  that did not want to divest themselves  of
orientated  or "big bang" in nature.  This is not an  the enterprise "jewels". The bank privatization  was,
entirely accurate  description  in many respects  and it  however,  entrusted to  a  separate  mechanism
is  important  to  distinguish policy  towards  the  involving  a  Bank  Privatization  Committee
rennant  of  the  state banking system from that  comprising  staff  of the Ministry  of Finance,  Bank  of
towards  the emerging  private  banking  sector.  Latvia,  and  Members  of Parliament.  This Committee
had considerable  latitude for decision making.  In
The  remnant of the state banking  system  contrast to the enterprise  privatization,  decisions  on
dealing  with  the remnant  were made  very quickly.
When Latvia gained its independence  in 1991,
it was confronted  with the same starting  position  as  It was decided  to keep the Savings  Bank in the
virtually all the other countries  comprising  the FSU.  public  sector  and  submit  it  to  considerable
Specifically, it  inherited branches of  the  same  institutional  development  support  (EU-Phare
specialized  Soviet banks as the other countries: the  financed), and bring in new management  prior toprivatizing  the  bank  in  due  course.  The  main  with the new commercial banks accounting for 89%
remnant was dealt  with in three  ways.  First, nine  of the total by the end of  1994, from only 23% two
branches were  sold to  private commercial  banks:  years earlier.  By contrast, the portion of the banking
one  branch to  Parex  Bank;  one  to Olimpija Bank;  system's  capital held by the new commercial  banks
and seven branches to Bank Baltija. Secondly, fifteen  remained  relatively  constant  over  the  1992-1994
of the branches were  consolidated into eight private  period,  although  the  aggregate amount grew  by  a
banks and sold through offerings of shares.  Finally,  factor of 15.
on  September 28,  1993,  the  rump  of  21 branches
was  structured  into  one  state  bank--the  Universal  The rise of Bank Baltija
Bank of  Latvia,  or  Unibank--and subject to  intense
institutional development  supported  by  the  World  Among the private banks that developed very
Bank  (Japanese  grant),  the  Government  of  quickly in 1993 and 1994 was Bank Baltija.  It began
Switzerland, and the European Union (Phare). Most  very  modestly but  then grew  substantially both  in
of the bad  loans 4 were  concentrated in the branches  terms of  assets and branches.  Its assets grew  from
of  this  bank  and  these  loans  were  taken  off  about  US$25 million in January  1993, to  US$242
Unibank's  books  and  replaced  by  Government  million in January 1994, and then to almost US$500
bonds.  The  restructuring  of  this  bank  and  its  million  by  early  1995.  Bank Baltija became  the
privatization is described  more  fully in Bereza and  largest Latvian commercial bank in terms of assets,
Fleming (forthcoming). One of the main reasons for  own  capital  and  deposit  funding  by  1994.  The
constructing  Unibank  was to  provide an  insurance  bank's own capital grew from about US$1 million in
policy  against  catastrophic  failures  in  the  private  early  1993 to US$20 million in January 1994 and to
banking sector.  US$44 million in January  1995. The bank  had  37
branches and 49 offices throughout Latvia with 1,300
The new commercial banks  employees in total.  In April 1995, when the banking
crisis  began,  the bank had total deposits of  US$392
Meanwhile,  government  policy  towards  the  million and a loan portfolio of US$283 million.
evolving  commercial  banking  sector  was  driven
primarily  by  Parliament's  insistence that  under the  The  bank's  ownership was  unclear  from  the
new market system any person or entity should have  beginning, but the perception was that it was largely
the  right  to  establish  a  bank.  As  a  result,  the  Russian backed.  There were nine main shareholders
commercial  banking  law  was  very  liberal  on  the  of the bank who owned 91% of total shares. Roughly
establishment of  banks.  As  in a  number of  other  59%  of the Bank Baltija shares were owned by the
parts of the FSU,  a plethora of banks emerged.  By  family of Alexander Lavent, Chairman of the bank's
1993 over sixty  banks had been licensed.  Some of  Supervisory  Board  (among  Lavent's  companies,
them were pocket banks owned by state enterprises,  several  are  Russian dominated and  registered  off-
some were purely private but were  dedicated mainly  shore).
to  raising  deposits  to  on-lend to  the  owners,  and
some  were  set  up  with  specific  functions in mind  Bank  Baltija  adopted,  from  its  inception,  a
(Olyrnpija  Bank  was  set  up  to  help  finance  the  strategy  for  development that  was  very  different
Latvian  Olympic  team).  The  incentive  for  from other banks in Latvia.  Its goal was to develop
establishing a  bank  was simply  to gain access to a  a large  network of branches and to become  a retail
much  cheaper  source  of  funding  than  going  to  bank  in  competition  with  the  Savings  Bank.  It
existing banking institutions.  All of these private or  offered  very  high  interest  rates  on  local  currency
quasi-private  banks  were  allowed  to  develop with  (Latvian  Lat) deposits--90% for one  year  deposits
little supervision from the Bank of Latvia initially.  during  1993--at  a  time  when  other  banks  were
offering  significantly  lower  deposit  rates  (18%-
52%).  By way of comparison, the Savings Bank was
As can be seen from Table I below, the size of  offering deposit rates of just  14-20%.  As a  result,
the new commercial banking sector in relation to the  many households switched deposits from the Savings
remainder  of  the  state  banking  sector  grew  very  Bank. Some first time depositors were also attracted
rapidly  over  the  period  1992-94.  The  number of  to  Baltija.  By the  end  of  1994 Baltija had  some
new commercial  banks  grew  to 59  by  the end  of  200,000 personal accounts.  Bank Baltija was at the
December,  1993 while their new branches increased  core of the banking crisis that was to emerge  in the
sharply.  Between  December  1992 and  December  Spring of 1995.
1994, the new commercial  banking  sector share of
total assets grew from 47%  to 85%.  Credits granted
by the banking system grew sharply over this period,
2Table 1.  STRUCTURE OF LATVIAN  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM, 1992-1994
Bank  Former branches  of
Bank of Latvia*  Savings  Bank
(state-owned)  (state-owned)  New Commercial Banks**  TOTAL
Number  of Banks
Dec. 92  1  1  50  52
Dec. 93  1  1  59  61
Dec. 94  1  1  55  57
Number  of Branches
Dec. 92  49  37  18  104
Dec. 93  21  35  82  138
Dec. 94  21  35  n/a  n/a
Assets. % of total
Dec. 92  39  14  47  US$610  million
Dec. 93  15  12  73  US$964  million
Dec. 94  8  7  85  US$2146  million
Credits. % of total
Dec. 92  70  7  23  US$230  million
Dec. 93  20  6  74  US$546  million
Dec. 94  7  4  89  US$730  million
Capital, % of total
Dec. 92  12  3  85  US$22  million
Dec. 93  10  2  88  US$122  million
Dec. 94  7  6  87  US$336  million
*  Figures for December, 1992 represent  former  branches  of the Bank  of Latvia that were overseen  by the Bank
Privatization  committee. Figures for December  1993  and December  1994,  reflect  the operations  of the Universal  Bank
(Unibank)  of Latvia. The number  of Unibank's  branches  increased  in August-September.  1995  as it took over branches  of
Bank  Baltija  and purchased  other small  commercial  banks. The Bank  of Latvia  had issued  licenses  to 27 branches  of
Unibank  as of 11/17/95.
**  This category includes: (i) the Latvian  Investment  Bank which is now 35% state-owned  with the balance  being
held by EBRD  (35%). Finnfund  (10%), Swedfund  (10%), and DEG (10%):  and (ii) the Latvian  Mortgage  and Land  Bank,
which is state-owned.
The Crisis and its Causes  The  growing  public  perception  that  Bank
Baltija was  in  difficulty  led  to  a  withdrawal  of
Manifestations of the crsis  deposits  from  the  bank,  mostly  by  enterprises
initially.  Households  were  slower  to  grasp  the
The banking crisis  in Latvia  came to a  head  gravity of the problem and so their withdrawals were
towards the end of March  1995,6  precipitated in part  more of  a  trickle than  a  classical run.  The other
by the insistence of the Bank of Latvia that all banks  banks  that  were  involved  in  the  crisis  also
should  prepare  and  present  to  its  Banking  experienced similar effects vis-a-vis their deposits.
Supervision Department  financial statements that had  Large numbers  of small deposit holders were caught
been audited on the basis of International Accounting  when the banks'  doors were  closed.  Yet there was
Standards.  It  was  the  failure  of  Bank  Baltija to  no  public  panic  in  the  capital,  Riga.  This
present such accounts, or indeed to give its auditors--  development was to some extent treated by the public
Coopers  and  Lybrand--full  access  to  needed  at  large as just  one  further  adversity in the painful
documentation for  the  audit of  1994 ftnancials that  process of  transition.  Some Bank Baltija depositors
set  off  a  chain  of  events  leading  to  the  bank's  may, in any case, have been resigned to the fact that
declaration of  insolvency. But  Bank Baltija was not  the high returns that they had earned on deposits was
the only bank  involved in  the  crisis at  this stage.  a premium that covered their subsequent losses.
Other banks included Latvian Deposit Bank, Centra
Bank and Olimpija Bank, all middle-sized banks that  The authorities'  immediate response
were  eventually declared  insolvent.  See  Table 2
below. A number  of smaller banks also  experienced  The Bank of  Latvia initially provided a
difficulty. 7 In  all,  about  40%  of  banking  system  modest amount of  liquidity support for Bank Baltija.
assets  and  liabilities  were  compromised,  totaling  Large corporate names such as the Latvian Shipping
almost US$900 million.  Company --as  well  as  several  major  Latvian
commercial  banks--also  provided  direct  liquidity
3Table 2.  RANKING OF TOP 20 BANKS (as of April 1, 1995)*
Name  of Bank  Assets  Own Capital  Deposits  Loans
(USS  million)  (US$ million)  (US$  million)  (US$ million)
Bank  Baltija**  496  53  392  283
Unibank  173  21  116  71
Riga Commercial Bank  170  19  124  71
Latvian  Krajbanka  166  21  138  33
Parex  Bank  163  13  106  85
Latvian  Deposit  Bank**  105  12  90  66
DLB  74  16  51  33
Zemes  Banka  73  7  58  31
Centra  Bank**  70  12  53  57
Rietumu  Bank  63  5  37  4
Baltic  Transit Bank  56  12  38  28
Olimpija**  55  13  43  36
Saules  Bank  53  6  43  10
Naftas  & Kimijas  Bank  39  6  24  23
Latintrade  Bank**  38  6  28  31
Latvian  Creditbanik  37  7  26  25
Latvian  Capital  Bank  35  2  31  1
Sakaru  Bank  34  4  24  15
Alejas  Bank**  29  4  22  19
Kredo-Bank"*  25  2  22  1
*) Source  of information: Latvian  Bankers  Association  (banks  were ranked  by assets).
**) Banks  that collapsed  in June-September,  1995.
support.  Initially  it  was  believed  that  Baltija's  Subsequently, the Bank of Latvia took over the
insolvency  problem  was  of  moderate  size--on  the  management  of  the  bank  in  the  context  of  an
order  of  $50  million--but as  the  accountants  dug  Agreement  drafted  between  the  owners  and
deeper into Baltija's  financial operations,  it became  management on the one side and the Bank of Latvia
clear that the bank's  negative  net worth  was as great  and Ministry  of Finance on the other. Initially,  this
as about $320 million  or 7% of the expected 1995  Agreement  was used by the owners  and managers  to
GDP. The Bank of Latvia at  this time refused to  try to obtain  concessions  from the Government,  on
provide further liquidity support.  The crisis had  the principle  that Baltija was too big to fail  and that
come  to  a  head.  Instead,  the  Bank of  Latvia  and  its  fall  would  have  significant  political
government  officials began  protracted  negotiations  ramifications.  Ultimately,  as  the  depth  of  the
with  the  owners  and  management  of  Baltija.  The  problem becamne  known,  and following advice from
owners  and  managers sought to  stall  for  time  by,  the Bank and IMF,  the  Agreement was redrafted to
among other  things, suggesting a  merger  with  the  give full control of  the bank  to the Bank of  Latvia
Latvian Deposit Bank and Centra Bank (these banks  (Baltija's owners could regain control of the bank if
were also declared insolvent at a  later stage) so that  they fully recapitalized it--an unlikely event given the
they  could  try  to  come up  with  a  recapitalization  degree  of  insolvency  of  the  bank).  So  the
plan.  In  retrospect,  this  provided  a  window  of  Agreement served to provide the Bank of Latvia with
opportunity for managers and  owners  to undertake  the powers to run and dispose of Baltija despite the
an asset stripping of the bank. See Box 1.  fact  that the  former  lacked  the  power  to  formally
intervene in the bank under the existing banking law.
Of the  roughly  US$500 million  in  assets  on
Baltija's books when the crisis began,  some US$260  General causes
million had disappeared by the time it was declared
insolvent in  July  1995.  In  addition,  funds  were  It is not possible to identify one single cause of
blocked  at  Baltija's  correspondent  accounts  with  the  banking  crisis  in  Latvia.  There  are  multiple
banks in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.  causes running from a set of general factors relating
4Box 1.  The Bank Baltija Loan Portfolio and the Russian Lntertek  Bank
In late-April  1995,  Bank Baltija  allegedly  sold more than half of its  loan portfolio  totaling  Ls 80 million  (USS 160 million)  to
Intertek,  a Russian  bank located  in Moscow. In return, Baltija  was to receive  Russian  government  bonds  equal to 29 percent  of
the par value  of the loans  sold. The  Russian  bank. however.  never  delivered  the bonds  to Baltija.
Since Baltija  was placed  under administration,  all efforts on the part of the administrator  to cancel  the loan sale agreement  and
have the loans returned  to Baltija  have  been unsuccessful.  In November,  an Economic  Court  in Moscow  declined  for the third
time to support Bank Baltija's claim on the loans, arguing that insufficient  documentation  had been provided  to prove the
existence  of the loan agreement. Intertek  has refused  to confirm  that a loan agreement  was  ever signed. Intertek  has taken  the
position  that all original  documents  on the loans  had been returned  to Baltija.
Lntertek  is a "pocket" bank that is owned  by major companies  participatnng  in the Russian  oil industry  and provides service  to
Russian  oil pumping  (Siberia),  oil refinery, and oil processing  companies.  The shareholders  of Intertek  are the largest of the
Russian  oil industry  companies. The bank's largest  shareholder  is the Russian  Ntinistry  of Energy.  There is also believed  to be
some  cross-ownership  between  Baltija  Bank  and Intertek.
to the transitional phase through which the economy  steady state.  At the same time the susceptibility of
was passing to a number of causes quite specific to  bankers to make mistakes will persist until they have
Bank Baltija.  fully absorbed the  lessons of  earlier  mistakes.  At
this juncture. the strucrure of the banking sector will
The transirional  process:  There  were  a number  stabilize  so that the banking  supervisors  will  be  able
of  general  factors  at  work  that tended to  create  a  to  "catch  up"  to a  degree.  In  short,  the  Latvian
vulnerability of Latvia to a banking crisis.  Put at its  banking system was always likely to be susceptible to
simplest.  the  three  major  players  in  the  banking  crises at this stage of its economic transition.
system--the  enterprise  borrowers,  the  bankers  and
the  banking  supervisors--were  all  prone  to  mistakes  Cor  iQon:  In  Latvia,  as  in other  transitional
as the economy made the transition from a command  economies, some banks were created--not primarily
to a free market system.  Enterprises made mistakes  to  service  the  banking  needs  of  the  public  and
as  they  adapted  production  and  other  forms  of  establish solid business relationships that could serve
economic activitv to the new market signals, as well  the  long  run  interests  of  the  bank--but  rather  to
as  to  competition  both  internally  and  externally. 9 achieve the  "get  rich quick"  goals of  owners  and
They  chose  projects  that  would  sometimes  fail,  management.  Rent-seeking activity of  this type  is
pulling  their  bartkers  down  with  them.  Bankers  characteristic  of  the  transitional  economies  at  this
meanwhile  were  still  learning  their  trade.  Bankers  juncture.  Such rent-seeking was encouraged by  the
involved  themselves  in a  wide  range  of  activities,  loose legal and supervisory framework that governed
some  of  which  proved  to  be  loss-making.'°  A  banking in Latvia and other FSU countries during the
significant  build-up  in  non-performing  loans  first several years of  the transition.  In some cases,
therefore  took  place  across the  banking  sector and  owners and managers primarily viewed the bank as a
collections  were  inhibited  bv  the  lack  of  laws  ready  made  source  of  financing  for  their  own
governing  loan  collateral.  In  Latvia,  one  business interests, which often took the form of trade
manifestation of this was that commercial banks had  activities  with  parties  located  to  the  east.  These
to make provisions of  about USS140 million at  the  owners  and  managers  were  encouraged  to  tap the
end of  1994.  In the first half of  1995, banks had to  bank's  resources  by  knowledge  that  there  were
make further provisions of about US586 million. The  significant 'loopholes"  in the banking law pertaining
banking supervisors were  also learning their  trade.  to insider transactions.  In other cases, owners and
Supervisors  throughout  the  world  are  invariably  managers tried to achieve their short-run profit goals
involved in a game of catch-up as they seek to keep  by taking excessive risks within the  bank,  often in
up  with  innovations  in  the  banks  they  supervise.  the form of high risk lending, or  by assuming large
Supervisors  in Latvia--and indeed other parts  of the  open foreign exchange positions.  In these instances,
FSU--are invariably further behind the quick-moving  the  owners  and  managers  were  undoubtedly
bankers  than  their  Western  counterparts.  It  is  encouraged  by  knowledge  that  the  supervisory
inevitable, therefore,  that the joint  vulnerabilities of  authoritv was inexperienced, understaffed and lacked
the  three  players  would lead to banking difficulties  effective enforcement powers--a situation  frequently
from  time to time as  the transition proceeded. This  found in the transitional economies.
vulnerability  to  crises will likely continue until  the
real sector of the economy has essentially completed  Stabil.atio  :  In  some  countries--notably  in
the  transition  and  settled  down  to  something  like  Latin  .America--banking  systems  have  become
5notably  susceptible  to  crisis  as  stabilization takes
hold.  Tight monetary policies introduced as part of  Trade financing: Latvia has a special position
the stabilization program typically force up nominal  between  East  and  West which  makes  it  especially
interest  rates  and  simultaneously  reduce  rates  of  suitable for financing trade between the  two areas.
inflation.  This can create  a  strong movement from  Special  financing opportunities arose during  1993/4
negative to positive real  interest  rates which has an  on account of the fact that prices of metals and other
impact on  the  ability of  borrowers  to repay  loans.  commodities in  Russia remained  well below  world
For much of  the pre-crisis period in Latvia, market  market  prices.  Latvian banks were  instrumental in
interest  rates  varied  significantly  between  banks,  financing East/West trade of  this type.  It was very
making it difficult to measure  the movement in real  profitable for both the traders and the banks, and the
interest rates. Before stabilization took hold in 1992,  latter  were  able to charge high rates of  interest on
inflation was running at over 500% and real interest  the  financing.  The existence of  this  type  of  high
rates were  significantly  negative.  A cornerstone of  return opporrunit  encouraged several Latvian banks
Latvia's  stabilization,  however,  was  a  verv  tight  to become involved.  The main difficultv came when
monetarv policv.  This was manifest in a reduction  Russian  prices  rose  to  near  world  levels  and  the
in interest rates that was not as sharp as the reduction  financing opportunities began to drv up.  This led to
in inflation. Subsequently, by mid-1993 (see attached  considerable pressure  on banks to find other lending
charts)  both  real  deposit  and  lending  rates  had  outlets.  This  put  downward  pressure  on  banks'
become  highly  positive.  The  authorities  pressed  profit margins as the banks scrambled to find equally
down on official interest rates, but market rates were  profitable but riskier lending outlets.
quite sticky,  reflecting  in part the high interest rate
strategy pursued by  Bank Baltija, which had already  Curren(  risk:  There  is evidence  that  Bank
attained a  dominant position  in the banking market  Baltija--and possibly other banks as well--followed a
(see section below on specific causes). Subsequently,  very high risk strategy in bidding for Lat deposits at
as  these special  factors  began to unwind real rates  very  high  interest  rates.  Convinced  that  the  Lat
fell to more modest levels by year-end 1993. Despite  would  depreciate  vis-a-vis  the  US  dollar,  Baltija
a gradual fall in nominal interest rates through 1994  repeatedly converted large volumes of Lats into US
and  into 1995 the rate  of  inflation fell further still,  dollars  and on-lent  these dollars, thereby creating a
leading to a  further  temporarv  rise  in real interest  large open  forex position. As it turned out,  the Lat
rates.  The lasting effects  of  the  high real interest  appreciated considerably against the US dollar over
rates in 1993. coupled with the temporary upturn in  the  1994/5 period.  It is possible that Bank  Baltija
real rates  in  1994,  may  well  have had  an  adverse  believed that by putting itself in a position where  it
effect on borrowers  through their  reduced ability to  dominated the banking system, any doubts about its
service  loans  from  local  revenues that would have  own solvency would precipitate a fall in the Lat and
grown  less  quickly  in  nominal terms.  This could  thereby improve the bank's financial condition.''
have lead to a general  deterioration in loan portfolio
quality.  Interest rate  riskL  A  related explanation  for
Bank Baltija's strategy is associated with its ambition
Corfidence  and  numors:  Another factor that  to become  a  major  retail bank.  Given that  it was
made Latvian private banks vulnerable to crisis was  able to  charge very  high rates on  its  trade  related
the  uncertainty  that  depositors  had  about whether  lending, Baltija was in a position to offer  verv high
they would be bailed out by Government in the event  deposit rates.  This it did with a  view to siphoning
of a difficulty arising. This was particularly the case  off  depositors  from  other  banks,  particularly  the
with  enterprises  or  other  entities that  had deposits  Savings  Bank.  Queues  formed  as  potential
and  showed  some  agility  in  moving them.  Even  depositors,  oblivious to  the  risks involved,  opened
unfounded rumors can lead to difficulties for specific  accounts with Bank Baltija at a rate of 90 percent for
banks in these circumstances.  In the later stages of  one year deposits. Baltija management furthered this
the  crisis,  two  of  the  largest  private  banks  aggressive strategy by opening a  significant number
experienced  such  withdrawals,  but  were  able  to  of  branches  around the country.  But  this  strategy
subsequently recover from the loss.  back-fired  as  market  interest  rates  fell,  exposing
Baltija to significant net interest margin pressures.
Specific causes
Poor  management.  As  it  expanded
There  were  a  number  of  specific  causes  aggressively,  Bank  Baltija  also  undertook  many
relevant to the  Latvian siruation.  All of them were  profligate  expenditures,  including throwing  lavish
applicable  to  the  Baltija problem,  with  some also
applicable to other banks.  6LATVIA
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1/  Three-month  moving  overage;  credits  and  deposits  of  3-6  months'  maturity.
2/  Computed  on  the  basis  of  the  three-month  moving  average  of  the  monthly  inflation  rate.
7Box  2.  Banking  Stability  Returns?
Structural  chnges:  On November  15, 1995,  the Latvian  Economic  Court  decided  to liquidate  three  banks: Olimpija.  Kredo  and
Olti.  On November  9,  1995, the Bank  of Latvia  also canceled  the license  of Riga International  Bank because  the bank was
insolvent.  The  bank had no household  deposits  and its major  creditors  were Bank Baltija  and the Savings  Bank. On December
It,  1995,  the Economic  Court declared Bank Baltija  bankrupt  and ordered its liquidation. This accion  was based  on the
recommendation  of Baltija's administrator,  who concluded  that the bank could not be rehabilitated. This recommendation  was
supported  by the Bank of Latvia, the Ministry  of Finance,  and Ernst & Young, the auditing  firm which  had been assisting  the
administrator.
Banking  System Data:  The table below presents  data on the size of the Latvian  banking system  for selected  months  from
December  1994  through  October 1995. The data includes,  up to May 1995,  all operating  banks and those banks  that were no
longer  operating,  but whose  licenses  had not yet been  canceled  by the Bank  of Latvia. This latter  group of banks  includes  Bank
Baltija,  Deposit  Bank  and Centra Bank. After May 1995,  the table only includes  those banks which are actually  operating  in
Latvia.
As indicated,  the banking  crisis resulted  in a shrinkage  in the size  of the banking  system  during  the late spring  and early  summer.
However,  since August, the total assets, total loans  and total deposits  of the system began to increase,  suggesting  that the
banking system  had begun to stabilize.  The one negative  was a continuing  downtrend  in the amount  of bank capital until
October.
While  not shown  in the table, there has also been  a sharp shift  in the composition  of deposits  from time  and savings  deposits  to
demand  deposits. Between January and September,  the amount  of time and savings deposits  fell from US$306  million to
US$146  million,  undoubtedly  reflecting  depositors'  desires  to maintain  maximum  flexibility  when  depositing  in banks.
Latvian  Commercial  Banking  System, 1994-1995
(Million  US Dollars)
1224  1995
Dec.  Mar.  Apr.  May* May"*  June  July  Aug.  Sept.  Oct.
Total  Assets  2146  2106  2074  2088  1464  1400  1304  1378  1400  1434
Total  Loans  730  746  756  764  524  470  426  440  430  424
Own Capital  336  326  312  316  262  248  260  250  242  256
Total  Deposits  938  934  938  914  644  580  528  534  544  568
No. of Banks  57  (57)  (57)  (57)  53  47  44  44  39  39
)  From  December  1994  to May 1995,  data includes  banks  operating  in Latvia,  as well as those  which  are no longer
operating  but had not lost their license.
**)  Banks  actually  operating  in Latvia  from May 1995  onwards.
parties  for  clients  and  government  officials.  This  modest growth  will have taken place in  1995. It  is
activity was  apparently  undertaken  as  a  means  of  likely that  the  adverse wealth effects, coupled with
insuring  itself  politically  against  any  future  the general effect on economic confidence, will have
difficuities  that  it  might  encounter.  In  general,  subsequent  negative effects on  the economy.  The
systems were not put in place to properly manage the  outcome might have been even worse were it not for
bank, particularly, as noted above, in the area of risk  the buoyancy of  the  newly emerging private sector
management.  that  has  little  linkage  with  the  banking  sector  as
either depositors  or  borrowers.  In real  terms, the
The Impact of the Banking Crisis  money supply declined by  17% during the first five
months of  1995.  Inflation has abated on account of
The Impact on the real economy  the  liquidity tightness while  nominal interest  rates
have  begun  to increase  since the  middle of  1995,
Data for the real sector of the economy suggests that  leading to  an  upturn in  real interest rates.  The net
the positive real growth expected  for 1995--a target  international reserves of the Bank of Latvia declined
of  5%--is  not attainable.  The  Latvian  authorities  from  a peak of  $466 million at  the end of  1994 to
have forecast that the banking crisis will "cost" up to  $369 million at the end of June 1995 as the Bank of
1.2% of  GDP in  1995 and  up to 2.2%  of GDP  in  Latvia intervened to maintain the Lat's parity vis-a-
1996.  The increasing tightness in liquidity brought  vis the Special Drawing Right (SDR).
about by the loss of deposits means that much more
8Impact on the budget  case.  the  bank  seems  to  have  been  the  victim of
unsubstantiated rumors  regarding its solvency, which
A severe budgetary crisis emerged  in Latvia in  reportedly led to the withdrawal of deposits by some
1995 and this has been exacerbated  by the  banking  major Westem European corporate depositors.
crisis  in  two  ways.  First,  the  lost  liquidity  of
enterprises has reduced their abiliry to pay taxes. The  The  fact  that  there  was  not  an  even  more
budget deficit that  had been expected  to be  US$80  widespread contamination of  the banking sector can
million for the whole of  1995 has ballooned to about  be attributed to the fact that the interbank market--a
USS140 million, or about 3%  of GDP.  Second, the  possible channel  for  contamination--accounted  for
fall  in  liquidity  of  the  banking  sector  at  large,  only 6% of total bank liabilities (at end-April).
reflecting  inter-alia  the  subsequent  reduction  in
deposits as a result of the banking crisis, led to a fall  Another concem  has  been  the  withdrawal of
in the demand for short-term Treasury  paper on the  deposits from  the  Savings  Bank in  recent  months.
part  of banks.  The outstanding  stock of  Treasury  This has taken place  in the  form of  a  trickle rather
bills fell from a peak of about $115 million in early  than a major run.  In some cases depositors who had
March  to  $50  million  at  the  end  of  June  1995.  lost funds in insolvent banks had to draw down funds
Hence, the financing side of  the budget also became  from  their  Savings Bank  accounts  to funance their
more problematic.  immediate needs.  The withdrawals also appear to be
associated with  a  general  fall  in confidence in the
The budget will also suffer because the Latvian  banking system by  household depositors.  Whereas
Government has used the banking system extensively  enterprise depositors must maintain a deposit balance
to  allocate  foreign  credit  lines  with  Govemment  in order to consummate transactions, the reaction of
guarantees to the private sector.  While it is not clear  households facing  uncertainty  is  to  keep  cash  in
at  this  stage  how  much  foreign  credit  has  been  either domestic or foreign currency.
channeled through  now  insolvent  banks,  the  main
difficulties have arisen with loans provided by the G-  A nunber  of other banks, the stronger ones in
24  and  IMF  (Structural  Transformation  Facility).  the  system,  have  consistently  benefited  from  the
These  loans  were  channeled  through  the  banking  difficulties  elsewhere  in  the  sector.  Unibank,  for
system without a  sound monitoring  system in place  instance, has consistently gained deposits.
for the banks and final users. This has meant that not
only weak  banks were  used  as  intermediaries,  but  The political impact
also funds were used for unauthorized purposes.'2
The  results  of  the  elections  at  the  end  of
Impact on other banks  September  have  led  to  a  rejection  of  the  ruling
centrist parties.  It was the centrist parties that held
It might have been anticipated that the banking  the  prime  economic  portfolios  in  recent  coalition
crisis in the spring of  1995 would have spilled over  governments.  It  is these  parties that  were  mostly
onto  the  surviving  banks,  presenting  them  with  associated with the banking collapse.  The parties at
potentially  serious  liquidity  pressures.  However,  the extremes of the political spectrum gained seats in
available  data  indicates  that  this  did  not  happen  the election, some  of  which  had  strongly criticized
initially.  In fact, between the beginning of May and  the  Government's  performance  in  handling  the
the beginnirg  of July--the period  when Bank Baltija  banking crisis.  While  the  banking  crisis may  not
was  obviously  failing  and  was  then  declared  have  been  the  primary  cause  of  a  shift  in  voter
insolvent--the  top  ten  banks  in  the  system,  in  sentiment, it was certainly  a contributing factor and
aggregate,  had  an  increase in  total  deposits of  3.3  an element in political campaigns.
percent.
Dealing with the  Afternath
However, during the month of July--just when
the  Baltija crisis  was  stabilizing--two  of  the  large  The Latvian Authorities  have had to deal not
banks began experiencing serious  funding problems.  only with the  immediate  management of  the crisis
Indeed, one of the banks sustained a decline in total  but also with the crisis of confidence in the banking
assets of 26 percent, while the other had a 20 percent  sector  and  the  political  fall-out  from  the  crisis.
decline compared  with the previous  month.  While  Urgent changes in the legal, regulatory. supervisory
complete  information  on  these  events  is  not  and  institutional  framework  have  been  made  in
available, the loss of  funding in one case appears to  recent months.
have  been  related  to  the  withdrawal  of  large
interbank balances by  Russian banks.  In  the  other
9Depositor compensation  cease and desist authority, the power to remove bank
management or  the authority to fine banks--that are
In order to rekindle confidence in the banking  typically found in effective banking laws.
sector,  the Government has decided to compensate
household  depositors  who  lost  funds  in  the  failed  The new banking law  that was drafted  in the
banks.  The Government plans to set a compensation  first  half  of  1995  was  much  more  detailed  and
ceiling  of  US$1,000  per  depositor.  Given  the  inclusive  than  the  1992  statute.  Moreover,  it
budgetary  constraints  that  the  Government is  now  substantially  strengthened  those  provisions  in  the
under,  cash compensation will be limited to US$400  1992  law  that  were  particularly  deficient.  Most
in the period from August 1995 to January 1996.  In  important,  the proposal gave  the  Bank of  Latvia a
the  subsequent  three  years  depositors will  receive  much  broader  range  of  enforcement  powers  for
US$200  additional per  year.  The  Government  is  supervising  the  banking  system,  and  plugged  the
hoping  to  cover  some  of  the  cost  of  such  loopholes in  the  1992 law  pertaining to  connected
compensation through the recoveries of assets of the  lending.' 3 In August 1995, the Parliament  began a
failed  banks.  There  must  be  some  question,  careful review of  the law  temporarily  approved by
however,  as  to  whether  the  Government  could  the Government in July. After adopting a number of
sustain  this  level  of  compensation,  given  the  largely  technical  amendments,  the  Parliament
budgetary tightness, and in the absence of recoveries  enacted the proposed law in October.
of assets from the failed banks.
The second law drafted by the Bank of Latvia
New banking legislation  in response to the emerging crisis was the Law on
Rehabilitation. This law was designed:  (1) to give
In  response to the banking crisis, the Bank of  the Govermment  a permanent institutional mechanism
Latvia  developed  three  banking  laws--a  new  for  rehabilitating  banks  whose  failure  could  have
conimercial banking law, a  law that would set up a  serious  adverse effects on public  confidence in the
bank rehabilitation/liquidation agency, and a law that  banking system and the functioning of  the payments
would  create  a  deposit  insurance  system.  These  system; and (2) to improve the process of liquidating
actions  were  taken in an effort to rebuild shattered  failed  banks--a  process  that  is  widely  viewed  in
public  confidence  in  the  banking  system  and  to  Latvia and other countries of the FSU as being slow
strengthen the legal and institutional framework that  and  ineffective.  The  proposed  law  called  for  the
underlies a banking system. Each of these three laws  creation of a Banking Agency, an independent
were  temporarily adopted by the Government in July  government  organization  that  would  handle  both
while  the Parliament was out of  session. However,  bank rehabilitations and bank liquidations.
each  of these laws had to be introduced and enacted
by the Parliament when the legislature reconvened.  In rehabilitating a  bank,  the  Banking Agency
would first try to arrange a private sector solution by
The  commercial  banking  lawv in  Latvia  was  having existing owners or new private sector entities
initially enacted in May 1992. This law was only six  carry  out the  rehabilitation.  However,  if a  private
pages long and can probably best be described as a  sector  solution is not  possible,  the  Agency  would
"bare  bones  first  effort"  to  provide  a  legal  consider undertaking the rehabilitation itself, if such
framework  for  banking  after  independence  was  an  action  were  deemed  to  be  essential  and  cost
obtained in September 1991. The major deficiencies  effective.  The Banking Agency would be  funded by
of  the  law  included  weak  licensing requirements,  contributions by  the  Government  and  the  Bank of
restrictions on connected lending that could be easily  Latvia, as well as by periodic premium payments by
circumvented, no limitations on a bank's investments  all  licensed  banks.  The  Agency's  ruling  board
in  real  estate  and  the  shares  of  non-banking  would  be  composed  largely  of  appointees  of  the
companies,  no  provisions governing the  change  of  Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Latvia.
control of an existing bank, and inadequate authority
for the Central Bank to close and liquidate a  bank.  The draft Law on Rehabilitations was adopted
But  probably  the  most  serious  deficiency was  the  by the Government on a temporary basis in July, and
lack of an adequate range of enforcement powers for  subsequently  submitted  to  the  Parliament  for
the  Bank of  Latvia, the supervisor of banks.  Under  permanent enactment.  However,  the  Parliament to
the  law,  the  Bank  was  limited  to  using  "moral  date has not enacted this proposal, perhaps reflecting
suasion", which may not be effective in some cases,  the  view  that  the  Banking  Agency  is  no  longer
and  revoking a bank's  license, which is a draconian  critically needed, now that the banking crisis  seems
supervisory action. The Bank of Latvia did not have  to have passed.
"intermediate  stage"  enforcement  powers--such  as
10Box 3.  World Bank  Coniments  on the Law on Rehabilitation
In its comments  on the draft law, the World  Bank  supported the concept  of setting  up a bank rehabilitation/liquidation
agency.  The Bank  stated  that there may be occasions  in the future when  the Government  will  have  to take  action  to rehabliitate  a
major  bank in order to prevent  the loss  of public  confidence  in the banking  system  and preserve  essential  banking  services  in the
country.  If so, it would  be better  for the Government  to rely on an experienced  organization  operating  under  a predetermiined  set
of rules than to carry out the rehabilitation  on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, the Bank believed  that having  a single on-going
organization  carry  out bank liquidations  would  be more  effective  than relying  on the present  system  of liquidating  banks through
the court  system.
However,  the Bank  recommended  several  important  changes  in the law. First, the Bank  argued  that the law should  contain
provisions  that clearly set forth the criteria that the agency  would employ  in deciding  whether  or not to rehabilitate  a failing
bank. The Bank believed  that Government-supported  rehabilitations  should  be limited  to only 'essential' banks whose  failure
could  have  adverse  systemic  implications.  Without  having  specific  "essentialiry  criteria' in the law,  the Bank  was  concerned  that
the agency  might  end up bailing  out banks irrespective  of their size  or importance.
Second,  the Bank expressed  concern  about the proposed  funding  of the agency.  The Bank  argued that, in principle, the
agency's funding  of bank rehabilitations  should  come  entirely out of the Government  budget. By concrast,  the proposed law
would  have the funding  come from three sources: (l) a capital  contribution  from the budget that was unspecified  both with
respect  to amount  and timing;  (2) annual  contributions  from the Central  Bank;  and (3) periodic  contributions  by all banks. The
Bank  indicated  that it realized  that the government  budget  was under  great  pressure  and that  the Government  may feel that it had
no alternative  but to rely to some extent  on non-budgetary  sources  of funding.  However,  if this were done, the Bank urged  that
the Government  "fLx"  the funding  of the rehabilitation  agency  as soon  as the budget  would  allow.
The third banking law  drafted by the Bank of  household  deposits.  A  number of  additional  banks
Latvia was the  Law  on  Compensation of Deposits.  have  been  forced  to close  with  the  result  that  at
This  law  would create  a  deposit  insurance system  present there are only 39 banks perrmitted  to operate.
that would  protect  individual depositors up  to  500  And  of  these,  only  14 have  full banking  licenses
Lats (the equivalent of $1,000) in the event of a bank  permitting them to accept household deposits.  The
failure. This  law  was designed to help  restore  the  remaining  25  banks  only have  restricted  licenses.
public's  confidence  in  the  banking  system,  reduce  Enforcement  has  been  improved  through  an
the likelihood of future bank runs,  and minimize the  amendment  to  the  Administrative  code  that  has
adverse wealth effects of  future bank failures.  Like  permitted the Bank of Latvia to impose fines on bank
the other  two proposed  laws,  the deposit insurance  management for violations of prudential regulations.
proposal  was  adopted by  the  Government in  July.
However,  while  subsequently  introduced  into  the  The Role of the World Bank
Parliament, the proposal has not yet been enacted.
During the period 1993-94, the Bank provided
support to the Government in its efforts to deal with
Tighter supervision  the  remnant  of  the  Soviet banking  system.  The
Bank, in the context of preparing its Enterprise and
The Bank of Latvia took much of the blame for  Financial  Sector  Restructuring  Project,  worked
the banking crisis  as there  were  clearly weaknesses  closely with the Bank Privatization Committee on a
in  the  implementation of  supervisory policy.  The  bank restructuring strategy which focussed on  what
head of banking supervision was forced to resign and  to  do  with  the  branches  of  the  former  Soviet
a  restructuring  of  the  Banking  Supervision  specialized  banks.  One  result  of  this  was  the
Department has  taken  place.  The  Bank of  Latvia  structuring  of  Unibank  and  its  subsequent  path  to
also  has  hired  additional  supervisory  staff,  has  privatization.  Technical assistance was also provided
moved  to  tighten  prudential  regulations,  and  has  to the Savings Bank (financed by EU-Phare).
required  banks  to  establish  internal  control
departments.  Technical  assistance  was  also  marshaled  to
strengthen the infrastructure for banking,  including
Moreover,  the  Bank  of  Latvia  has  made  bank  supervision.  In  this  area  the  IMF  provided
arrangements  for  external  accounting  firms  to  significant assistance. with support also provided by
supplement the work of the Bank of Latvia's on-site  EU-Phare.  The World Bank Project also provided
examiners. This more intense supervision will focus
on  the  "core"  banks  that  are  permitted  to  take
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failus  --  fro  those  dsitors  who  are itsred.to those who are riot.  e  a  ar.gued:  thattiuis  resut-.ld:
defeatione  of the inaor objectives  oai  dosit inisuance syste  m- to promote pDuic confiden.  his obie  cou  y 
ttained if sofie4depos  ors are proteted while:oEther  dewsitors are left no worse off.  . ...  .
inter-alia institutional development support for other  fraud, it is not unusual to discover later on that there
commercial banks that  met prudential requirements,  are large deposits and guarantees that have not been
as  part of  the  establishment  of  the  credit  line  for  recorded on the bank's  books. Given this possibility,
private enterprises.  As part of this project, the Bank  Governments virtually never attempt to rehabilitate a
pressed  for a  strengthening  of  the  legal framework  bank involved in fraud.
for property rights, collateral and bankruptcy.  These
areas are foundational for the establishment of robust  The third  issue  on  which the  Bank provided
lending mechanisms within the banking system.  advice  related  to  the  Bank  of  Latvia acting  as  a
lender of last resort.  In the spring of 1995, it became
After the banking crisis broke,  a new phase of  increasingly clear to the Bank that Latvia was going
assistance  was  initiated.  In  addition  to providing  to  have  a  major  banking  crisis--with the  probable
advice to the Government on the three banking laws  failure of four banks comprising about 40 percent of
noted  above,  the  Bank  advised the Government on  the system's  assets. Moreover, it appeared that there
four  other  issues.  The  first  involved  the  was essentially nothing that the Government could do
Government's  negotiations with  the management of  about  the coming  crisis--Bank Baltija could not be
Bank  Baltija  to  recapitalize  the  bank,  thereby  saved  for  the  reasons  listed above,  and  the  other
restoring the bank to solvency.  banks probably were not large and important enough
to be worth trying to save. In this situation, the key
T-he Bank  advised  the  Government  to  cease  policy objective was to make sure that the rest of the
these negotiations and  promptly  bring  a  petition to  banking  system  would  get  through the  crisis.  The
the courts  to have the  bank declared bankrupt. One  Bank believed that the size of the crisis and the great
reason for the Bank's  advice was the belief that the  media  attention being  given  to Bank Baltija would
management did not have either the intention or the  have a  serious  adverse effect on public confidence
resources to recapitalize the bank, given the depth of  and  might  lead  to  significant  deposit withdrawals
the insolvency. But even if the required capital could  from the  remaining banks. If so, the key to holding
be raised,  the Government,  as a matter of principle,  the  banking  system  together  would  be  effective
should not restore  the bank to management that had  lender of last resort support by the Bank of Latvia.
grossly  mismanaged and  apparently  defrauded  the  Accordingly,  the Bank urged the Bank of  Latvia to
bank.  get  prepared  and  be  willing  to  supply  needed
liquidity support to all  banks that were  solvent and
The second issue was whether the Government  could provide required collateral.
itself should attempt  to recapitalize  the bank,  install
new  management,  and  then  later  on  privatize  the  The  fourth  area  where  the  Bank  provided
bank when it was fully rehabilitated.  On this issue,  advice  was  on  methodologies for dealing with  the
the Bank advised the  Government  =L to artempt a  compensation of depositors in the failed banks.  The
recapitalization.  One reason was that the bank was  Prime  Minister had  publicly stated his intention to
known  to be  extremely  insolvent,  and  "filling the  compensate household depositors in the failed banks.
hole"  would place  enormous  pressures  on a  budget  With this as a given, the Bank developed options for
that was already under great strain.  A second reason  compensating  depositors.  This  work  was  also
was that the  taua1  hole  in Baltija might turn out to  supported  by  EU-Phare  consultants  who  were
be  much  larger  than  currently  thought.  In  those  instrumental in assisting with the implementation of
cases where banks have been the victim of apparent  the scheme.
12supervision  in constraining  undue bank risk-taking).
During  the crisis  phase, the Bank also provided  Another government  action is to develop  effective
technical  assistance  through  the use of the staff of its  mechanisms  for handling  problem  banks  and closing
Technical Unit that had been originally set up to  insolvent  banks  promptly. In Latvia, it was not just
channel a  credit  line  under  the  Enterprise and  that Bank Baltija, the largest bank in the system,
Financial  Sector Restructuring  Loan.  Finally, the  failed, but that when it was finally  closed,  it was so
Bank acted as a catalyst  for technical  support from  deeply insolvent  that the Government  essentially  lost
other donors.  the option of bailing out this key bank in order to
protect  depositors  and the payments  system.
Lessons Learned
The third lesson relates  to those banks  that are
There are five important  lessons  to be learned  still in the state sector and are awaiting  privatization.
from the Latvian  banking  crisis--lessons  that can be  At  the time of a  banking crisis,  it is extremely
applied  to other  transitional  economies.  helpful  if these  banks  are able to serve as a source  of
strength to the banking system, as Unibank  clearly
The first lesson  is that both the economies  and  did in Latvia. This result is possible  only if the state
the banking systems of  transitional countries are  banks have strong, effective management  and are
inevitably  exposed  to major strains and stresses, at  relatively  free from political influence,  particularly
least during the first several years of the economic  relating to their lending operations. It  should be
reform process. These cannot be avoided,  given  the  noted that Unibank  had been undergoing  extensive
enormous  distortions  built up in socialist economies  financial  and operational rehabilitation  for several
over the years. Such  distortions  must be addressed  if  years prior to the banking  crisis in early 1995,  with
these countries are  to  achieve efficient resource  substantial  help from foreign  sources.
allocation  and rapid  economic  growth.
The  fourth  lesson  is  that  the  supervisory
Banking systems are  exposed  to  stress in  authorities in  transitional economies should look
several major ways.  First, enterprises, which are  carefully at  banks  which  are  'outliers"  in  the
the primarily  borrowers  from banks, become  subject  banking system. Banks that  are  expanding their
to  hard  budget  constraints, thereby  cutting off  assets or branch networks exceptionallv  quickly,  or
government  funding  that is critical to the servicing  of  banks that  are  offering particularly high deposit
their bank debt. As the reform process proceeds,  rates,  should be  subject to  intense supervision.
these enterprises  are privatized,  thereby irretrievably  Activity  in specific  banks which is outside  the norm
cutting  them off from any hope of financial  support  for  the  banking system as  a  whole may be  an
from the government.  Second, the sharp decline  in  indicator  of a problem  in the bank concerned.
inflation  that typically  accompanies  macroeconomic
stabilization  means that enterprises can no  longer  The  fifth  lesson is  that  fraud,  managerial
depend on  rapidly increasing revenues to  service  incompetence  and  excessive risk-taking  can have
their bank debts. Third, economic reform tends to  devastating  effects on a banking system,  particularly
produce banking  systems  that are primarily  privately  if they occur in one of the largest  banks. In banking,
owned. This cerainly has been the case in Latvia,  there are four primary ways to protect  against  these
Estonia and Russia. While the privatization  of the  exposures.  The first is to carefully  screen  those  who
banking system is  clearly desirable from  many  want to get into banking. Second,  all banks  should
perspectives,  it makes  the system more vulnerable  to  be  subject  to  frequent,  thorough  on-site
deposit withdrawals  because the public does not  examinations;  and  the  best  examiners should be
presume that failing  banks will be bailed out, as is  allocated  to  the largest banks whose failure could
usually  the case  with  state-owned  banks.  have systemic  implications.  Third, all banks should
be  required to  be  audited annually by  reputable
The second lesson follows from the first. If  auditing  firms, and these firms should  be required  by
banking  systems  are  exposed  to  stress,  the  law  to  immediately  report  any  significant
government must take  strong  actions to  protect  irregularities  to the supervisory  authorities.  Fourth,
against this vulnerability. One way to do this is to  when a bank gets into difficulty  and there  is a hint of
get the legal framework  for banking  in proper order,  fraud, the authorities should act decisively  to deal
develop  an effective  bank supervision  and regulation  with the bank and those  responsible  for the problem.
capacity  (in order to constrain undue risk-taking  by
banks),  and  implement good  bank  accounting,
disclosure  and auditing  standards  (which  will help to
develop market discipline and  supplement bank
13ENDNOTES
Ms. Brigita  Usakova  and Mr. Roger  Handberg  of the World  Bank  Technical  Unit in Riga, Latvia  also  made  significant
contributions  to the paper. Helpful  comments  were  also received from Lars Jeurling,  Paul Siegelbaum,  Alan Roe,  and Lily
Chu. Suzanne  Coffey  handled  the production  of the paper.
The Government  also decided  to revive  a state bank  that had existed  during Latvia's short period  of independence
between  the two world wars. The Mortgage  and Land  Bank was  established  on March 19, 1993  by Governrment  resolution,
as a state commercial  bank. The bank's initial  shareholders'  capital  was  U  100,000,  or USS  200,000  (100%  held  by the
Government).  The bank started  to grant  mortgage  loans  to Latvian  farmers, entrepreneurs  and private  persons,  mortgaging  real
estate  and land in cities and rural areas, and  to perform  payment  and credit  transactions  related  to the privatization  of state
property  (land,  housing).
1
All  data in this article relating  to Latvian  Lat amounts  are subsequently  expressed  in dollars  at an exchange  rate of
US$2=  Lat I .
The US$ 50 million in non-performing  loans  comprised  about 40% of the assets of Unibank  as of March 1994.
Banking  intermediation  (defined  as total  deposit  funding)  stood  at 21% of GDP in 1993  rising  to 40% during  the first  six
months  of 1995.
Although  seven  smaller banks had been declared  insolvent  in 1994: Lotta, Latvian  Bank for Reconstruction  and
Development,  Baltic Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  Kurzeme,  Sigulda. Tautas  and Top-banka.
Other banks declared insolvent  in 1995  were Latintrade,  Latgale  Commercial  Bank, Liepajas  Commercial  Bank,
Polarzviagzne  Bank, Alejas  Commercial  Bank,  Kredo  Bank,  Olti-Bank  and Bauskas  Bank.
The Latvian  Shipping  Company  and connected  companies  abroad  have lent funds to Bank  Baltija  in an amount  of Ls 23
million  (US$46  million). These loans  were secured  by a mortgage  on Baltija's loan portfolio,  real estate, vehicles  and
intellectual  property.
The slow pace of privatization  likely  exacerbated  this problem  in Latvia.
10 Bankers  are hampered  in transition  economies  by a lack  of safe, short-term  financial  instruments  in which to invest  their
liquidity. This makes  them more likely  to take risks in lending.
H  This explanation  for Bank  Baltija's  demise  is contained  in a paper  by Hallagan  (Big  Bang Banking  Reform:  the Latvian
Experience,  July 1995).
A lesson  to be learned  here is that in transitional  economies  it is important  to structure  very  strong  mechanisms  for
channeling  credit through  comnmercial  banks  to the  private  sector. Such  mechanisms  should  involve  the continuous  monitoring  of
intermediary  banks,  focusing  in  particular  on the establishment  of monitorable  goals  for their capitalization,  adherence  to
prudential  ratios,  risk management  capabilities,  etc. The  focus, in the initial  stages  of implementing  a credit  line,  should  be on
the strengthening  of the intermediaries  with  less  emphasis  on targets  for lending  volume.
13 The World  Bank, in providing  comments  first  to the  Government  and later to the Parliament,  strongly  supported  the new
banking  law and urged its speedy  enactment.  The  Bank  argued  that the new law represented  a substantial  improvement  over the
1992  law, particularly  in strengthening  the Central  Bank's  enforcement  powers.REFERENCES
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